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SUMMARY 
A cla ssi fica tion theorem for vo ting rule s on a smoo th choice 
space W o f  dimension w i s  pre sented . I t  i s  shown tha t, for any non-
collegial vo ting rule, a, there exi st integer s v •( a) , w •( a) (wi th 
v •( a) < w •( a) ) such tha t  
(i)  struc turally stable a-vo ting cycle s may alway s be 
con struc ted when w l v •( a) + 1 .
(ii) a struc turally stable a-core (or vo ting equilibrium) may be 
con struc ted when w � w •( a) - 1 .
A s  a corollary, i t  i s  shown tha t  a a-vo ti ng cycle may alway s be 
con struc ted i f  W is fini te and o f  cardinali ty at lea st v •( a) + 2 .  
Finally i t  i s  shown tha t  for an anonymou s q-rule ,  a struc turally 
stable core exi sts in dimen sion n - 2, where n i s  the cardinali ty o fn - q 
the socie ty .  
CLASS IFICATION T HEOREM FOR SMOOTH SOCIAL CHOICE 
INTRODUCTION 
Norman Schof ield 
Cal ifornia Inst itute of Technology 
Th is paper proves a class if icat ion theorem for smooth soc ial 
cho ice on a pol icy space, or manifold, W .  By smooth soc ial cho ice is 
meant a soc ial preference relat ion, a(u) , obtained from a smooth 
preference prof ile, u, for the soc iety, where a(u)  can be represented 
by p iecewise d ifferent iable trajector ies in W .  By a class if icat ion is 
meant an analys is of the nature of a(u) for all smooth prof iles in 
terms of the d imens ion of the pol icy spac e .  Smooth soc ial cho ice 
includes what is often termed spat ial vot ing g ames . 
One method of analysis of spat ial vot ing games has been to 
determine those s ymmetry cond it ions , on the d irect ion grad ients of the 
ut il ity funct ions of the ind iv iduals at a po int , suff ic ient to 
guarantee the ex istence of a core at the po int . Results by Plott 
[26] , Slutsky [39] , Matthews [20,21]  ind icated , for major ity rule in 
par ticular, that a core , if it d id occur, would be structurall y  
unstable in the sense that arb itrary small perturbat ions in preference 
would render it empty . A parallel l ine of enqu iry cons idered the 
ex istence of vot ing cycles . A result by Kr amer [ 1 5] showed , aga in 
essent ially for major ity rule in two d imens ions , that cycles must be 
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expected . In a ser ies of papers by McKelvey [ 17 , 1 8] , Cohen [3] , Cohen 
and Matthews [4] and Matthews [22] th is result was extended to show 
the ex istence of dense cycles, or vot ing trajector ies that could 
wander chaot ically throughout the space . Results by Schof ield 
[30 , 3 1 , 3 4] for a general vot ing rule , a, without vetoers, showed the 
ex istence of an instab il ity d imens ion w•(a) , say. In part icu lar in 
d imens ion w•(a) , or more , the core must be "nearly" always empty . In 
d imens ion w•(a) + 1 or more, dense cycles almost always occur , and in 
d imens ion w* ( a) + 2 or more the "cycle set" is not only open dense but 
path connected . In these h igher d imens ions, a res ult by Matthews [22] 
impl ied that agenda manipulat ion could lead to almost any outcome (see 
also [11] ) .  
A rather d ifferent research progr am has sought cond it ions 
under which a core would ex ist . The class ical argument by Downs [ 8] 
on the ex istence of a core in the one-d imens ional case was extended by 
Kr amer and Klevor ick [16] and Salles and Wendell [28] . In the case 
when the pol icy space was compact , convex ( i. e . , adm issible ) and 
preference convex then Greenberg [13 ] showed the ex istence of a 
stab il ity d imens ion v •( a) below which a core would ex ist , and above 
wh ich a core need not ex ist , for an anonymous rule, a .  
In parallel t o  the results o n  vot ing rules for ut il ity on 
pol icy spaces , a number of authors [ 6 , 10 , 2 5] ex amined the ex istence of 
a core when the alternat ive set , W, was of f inite and restr icted 
card inal ity. In part icular, Nak amura showed, for any vot ing rule , a ,  
without vetoers, that there ex ists a n  integer, the Nakamura number, 
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v ( a) , such tha t  lwl i v ( a) - 1 i ff the core exists for any acyclic 
pro file on W [ 23 ] . 
Independently S trnad [40] and Scho field [3 5, 3 6] showed, in the 
spa tial case , tha t  a su fficient condi tion for the non-emp tiness o f  the 
core is tha t  the dimension o f  the policy space is no grea ter than 
v ( a) - 2 .  
In this paper we show tha t the s tabili ty dimension, v* ( a) , o f  
a general vo ting rule, a ,  wi thou t ve toers, is precisely v ( a) - 2 .  In 
par ticular , in dimension a t  leas t v ( a) - 1 i t  is possible to cons truc t 
s truc turally s table cycles, in the sense tha t  the cycles canno t be 
des troyed by small per turba tion o f  pre ference . The me thod is to 
cons truc t, in tha t  dimension, a simplex which , in a cer tain sense, 
re presents the vo ting ru le .  In dimension v ( a) - 1 the cycles tha t  we 
consider mus t belong to the pare to se t. Since v ( a) = 3 in general for 
majori ty rule, one o f  the implica tions is tha t  "local" agenda 
manipulation canno t lead ou t o f  the pare to se t, a t  leas t in two 
dimensions . In higher dimensions this is no t necessarily the case . 
The second resul t o f  the paper is to ob tain a lower bound on 
the ins tabili ty dimension. In par ticular we show tha t  i f  a is an 
anonymous q -rule (where any coali tion o f  si ze q ou t o f  n players is 
decisive ) ,  and the dimension o f  the policy space is no grea ter than 
g = � then the core may exis t in a s truc turally s table fashion. As an 
immedia te corollary i t  is evident tha t  for such a rule the ins tabili ty 
dimension w* (a) exceeds n....=...1 . Th is latter resul t was essen tiallyn - q 
mo tivated by a recent paper by Cox [ 5] which explored condi tions 
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sufficient for a s truc turally s table core in two dimensions . 
The signi ficance o f  the two resul ts lies in the classi fica tion 
o f  vo ting rules thus provided .
(i)  In the s table dimension range, where the dimension of the 
policy space does no t exceed v* ( a) , then "local" cycles may 
no t occur . For convex pre ferences the core will be non-
emp ty .  
( ii) In the in termedia te dimension range 
v ( a) + 1 i dim(W) i w* ( a) - 1 ,  s truc turally s table cycles
exist. Moreover, even for non-convex pre ference, i t  is 
possible to cons truc t a s truc turally s table core . 
( iii) In the uns table dimension range , above w* ( a) ,  a s truc turally 
v* ( a) 
s table core canno t be guaranteed . 
I t  is true , for simple majori ty rule wi th n odd , tha t  
1 and w* ( a) = 2 .  As a consequence the intermedia te dimension 
range is emp ty .  However, even for majori ty rule, wi th n even, the 
intermedia te range includes the two dimensional case . For general 
vo ting rules i t  is now clear tha t  the intermedia te dimension range is 
no t unimpor tant. 
An ac tual poli tical sys tem, which generally consis ts o f  
complex "hierarchical" vo ting rules ,  will plausibly exhibi t a 
signi ficant intermedia te dimension range . This sugges ts tha t  ac tual 
poli tical even ts may no t, in fac t, display the chao tic behavior 
charac teris tic o f  the uns table dimension range ( see [14, 41] and the 
ar ticle s in [24] for ex ten sive d iscu ssion ). On the contrary , 
pol itical equ il ibr ium ( the core ) may ex ist in a struc turally stable 
fash ion for some time, bu t th is equ il ibr ium may then "d issolve" in a 
"ca ta stroph ic "  fa sh ion to g ive way to struc turally stable cycle s, a s  
preference s  or pol itical con stra in ts slowly change . See [32] where 
th is wa s earl ier sugge sted on intu itive ground s. A s  lo ng a s  the 
s 
underly ing d imen sion of the pol icy space is l e ss than w* ( a )  + 1 ,  then 
the se struc turally stable cycles w ill no t be den se .  Pol itical log-
roll ing and agenda man ipula tion in th is situa tion may well, however , 
bring abou t ou tcome s tha t  are no t Pare to op timal .  
The nex t  sec tion of the paper briefly rev iew s recent analy se s  
of voting rule s on a f in ite se t of al terna tive s, the th ird sec tion 
pre sents the def initions of the key concepts and prov ide s a sta temen t  
of the cla ssif ica tion theorem, wh ile the four th and f if th sec tions 
prove the re sul ts on the stab il ity and instab il ity d imen sions. 
EXISTE NCE OF CY CLES A ND T HE CORE 
Throughou t the paper we shall u se the def initions, no ta tion 
and term inology of [31]  to wh ich the reader is referred . We rev iew 
the se definitions a s  follows. 
A str ic t preference P on a se t of al terna tives, W, is a b inary 
relation on W wh ich is irreflex ive ( i.e . , xPx for no x in W )  and 
a symme tr ic ( i. e . , xPy impl ie s  no t(yPx ) for any x , y  in W ). 
A preference, P, is transitive if xPy and yP z impl ie s  xP z, for any 
x,y, z e W .  A sub se t {x1 , • • •  ,xr} o f  W is a P-cycle iff 
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x 1Px2 • • •  PxrPx1 • If P is a preference and W conta ins some P-cycle
then P is sa id to be cycl ic on W .  I f  W conta ins no P-cycle ,  then P is 
sa id to be acycl ic on W .  A prof ile for a soc ie ty N = { 1 ,  • • •  , i, • • •  , n} 
is a l ist P = {P1 , • • •  , Pn} of str ic t preference s, one for each member
of the soc ie ty .  Le t B ( W )  repre sen t the cla ss o f  str ic t preference s on 
W, and B ( W )N the class of prof il e s  on W who se components are str ic t 
preference s. S imilarly le t A (W )  and A (W )N repre sent the cla ss of 
acycl ic str ic t preference s and acycl ic prof il e s. In th is paper the 
se t of al terna tives, W, w il l  be a ssumed to be e ither ( i) of f inite 
card inal ity ,  l w l , ( ii) a sub se t of a topolog ical vec tor space or ( ii)
a f inite-d imensional smooth man ifold . In the case tha t  W is a sub se t 
of a topolog ical vec tor space , we shall call W adm issible if it is 
compac t, convex and we shall u se d im(W) to refer to the d imension of 
W ,  i. e . ,  the d imen sion of the aff ine man ifold spanned by W.  If W is a 
smooth man ifold then each po int ha s a ne ighborhood locally isomorph ic 
to an open se t in :mw , where w = d im(W ) ( see [2 9] ). 
A soc ial preference func tion ( SF )  is a func tion, a, wh ich
a ssigns to any prof ile, P,  of str ic t preference s a str ic t preference, 
a(P ), and moreover sa tisf ie s the independence axiom ( see [31, Def. 
2 . 2 ] . Here we shall pr inc ipally exam ine simple soc ial preference 
func tions, or voting rule s. A coal ition, M, is dec isive for a SF , a ,  
iff for any prof ile, P ,  and any al ternative s x , y  e W 
xP iy for all i e M � xa( P )y.
Le t ID a refer to the cla ss of dec isive coal itions for a.  If a is such 
tha t  xa(P )y � xPiy for a ll i in some coa li tion M in ID a ' then a is 
said to be simple , and is re ferred to as a vo ti ng  ru le .  
Examp les o f  vo ting ru les are as fo llows : 
( i )  a i s  a q (w )-simple wei gh ted ma jori ty ru le i ff each 
individual, i, is assigned a real va lued integer weight 
w ( i )  2 O. A coa li tion, M, be lo ngs to IDa i ff 
w(M) = \ W( i )  2 q ,  where the integer q is o ften ca lled the 
f&M 
quo ta o f  a .  We may re fer to such a vo ting rule by the 
symbo l [q : w ( l ), • • •  , w ( n )] .
(ii ) a is a simple g-ma jori ty ru le or g-ru le i ff a is a simp le 
weigh ted majori ty ru le wi th w ( i )  = 1 for i = 1 ,  • • •  , n, and 
q > n/2 . 
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( iii ) a is the simple ma jori ty ru le i ff a is the simp le q-majori ty 
ru le with q = k + 1 i f  n is odd and n = 2k + 1 or n is even 
wi th n = 2k . 
An impor tant ques tion in socia l choice is whe ther an SF , a ,  is 
acyc lic in the sense tha t  a(P ) e A ( W )  for a ll P e A (W )N and 
appropria te W .  I f  a point x e W be longs to a a ( P )-cyc le then we shall 
say x be longs to the globa l cyc le se t G C( a ,W,N, P ). In the case tha t  W 
is o f  fini te cardina li ty ,  then G C( a,W, N, P )  is emp ty only i f  the £.Q£g 
(or globa l optima se t) 
GO ( a,W, N ,P )  {x e W : �y e W s t. ya ( P )x}
is non-emp ty [38] . We shall wri te G C( a, P ) and GO ( a, P )  for these two 
se ts when there is no ambigui ty .  
Wi thou t imposing fur ther restric tions on W o r  P ,  a necessar y 
condi tion for a ( P ) to be acyc lic is tha t  IDa be co lle gia l. More 
forma lly , i f  JD = {A1 , • • •  , Ar} is a c lass o f  coa li tions then the 
intersec tion C( ID) = A1 n · · · n Ar is ca lled the co lle gium o f  ID • ID 
is ca lled co llegia l or non-co llegia l depending on whe ther C( ID) is 
non-emp ty or emp ty .  I f  C( IDa ) i s  non-emp ty then the SF , a,  i s  ca lled 
co lle gia l and the members o f  C( IDa ) are known as ve toers ; o therwise a 
is ca lled nQn-co lle gia l. If W is a se t o f  fini te , bu t arbi trary, 
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cardina li ty and a is a non-co llegia l SF then i t  is a lways possib le to 
find an acyc lic pro fi le P on W such tha t  a(P ) is cyc lic [2] . 
Suppose now tha t  a is a non-co llegia l simp le q-majori ty ru le 
( i . e . ,  q < n ). Ferejohn and Gre ther [ 1 0] have shown tha t  i f  W is o f
fi nite cardinali ty, IW I, wi th lw l = r then a(P ) e A (W )  for a ll 
P e A ( W )N i ff q > ( r - 1 )n. Thus the q-ru le ,  a ,  is acyc lic i ff r 
IW I < �n�. In o ther words a(P ) is acyc lic i f  IWI < �n�, and an n - q n - q 
acyc lic pro fi le P can be found on W whenever lw l 2 �n� such tha tn - q 
a(P ) is cyc lic . The first inequa li ty may a lso be wri tten 
IW I � v ( n, q )  + 1 where v ( n, q )  is the larges t integer which is s tric tly 
less than __JL_ .  n - q 
In a recen t paper Greenberg [13 ]  ex tended this result by 
showing tha t  for a q-ru le ,  a, i f  W is admissib le ,  o f  dimension w, and 
each individua l pre ference is continuous and convex (in a sense to be 
made precise be low ) then the core , GO ( a , P ), is non-emp ty i ff 
q > ( �1 )n . Again this inequa li ty can be wri tten dim(W) � v ( n, q ). w + 
Greenberg then ob tained the Ferejohn-Gre ther resul t by embedding a 
fini te se t, W, o f  cardinali ty (w + 1 ) , in the w-dimensional simplex . 
By a qui te independent procedure , Nakamura [23 ] ob tained a 
cardinali ty res tric tion on W which was necessary and su fficient for 
the non-emp tiness o f  the global op tima se t GO ( a, P )  in the case o f  a 
general vo ting rule.  
De fini tion 1 
I f  ID is a family o f  subse ts o f  N, then the Nakamura number
v ( ID ) o f  ID is de fined as follows: 
( i )  i f  C( ID ) i <II then v ( ID ) = =. 
( ii ) i f  C(ID) = c(l then
v ( ID ) = min{fID •f ID ' c ID and C (ID ' ) = <PJ • 
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I f  a is a social pre ference func tion wi th decisive coali tions 
ID a ' then the Nakamura number, v ( a ), of a is de fined to be v (ID a).
Nakamura [23 ] then showed , in the case W had fini te 
cardinali ty ,  l wf, tha t
( i )  i f  l w l l v ( a) then there exis ts a pro file P e A (W )N such
tha t  GO(a, P )  is emp ty .  
( ii ) i f  P e A (W )N and l wl i v ( a) - 1 then GO( a,P ) i <P. 
I t  can readily be shown [3 5, lemma 7 ]  tha t  i f  a is a q-rule , then 
v ( a )  = v(n, q )  + 2 .  Thus , as a corollary o f  Nakamura 's resul t, the 
necessary and su fficien t cardinali ££ res tric tion on a fini te se t, W, 
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for a q-rule to exhibi t a non-emp ty core is fW I i v ( n , q )  + 1 .
Nakamura 's extension o f  the Ferejohn-Gre ther resul t indicated 
tha t  i t  should be possible to ex tend Greenberg 's resul t to show, when 
W was admissible and pre ferences continuous and convex, tha t a core 
for the vo ting rule a will exist i ff dim ( W )  i v ( a) - 2 .  
In two recent papers ( [ 3 5] ,  [36] ) the su fficiency par t o f  this 
resul t was obtai ned :  tha t  i s  to say for a general non-collegial 
vo ting rule,  a, on a policy mani fold , W, i t  was shown tha t  i f  
dim ( W )  � v ( a) - 2 then, in a cer tain sense , no cycles could occur . 
Moreover, i f  i t  is fur ther assumed tha t  W is admissible and pre ference 
is convex , then a core for the vo ting rule, a, will be non-emp ty in 
this dimension [40] . 
One o f  the resul ts o f  this paper is to show tha t  this 
dimension cons traint is necessary . In par ticular , i f  a is a SF wi th 
Nakamura number v ( a), and dim(W ) l v ( a )  - 1 then we shall show tha t  i t
is possible to cons truc t a pre ference pro file P an W such tha t  a(P ) 
exhibi ts cycles, and has an emp ty core . Moreover , the pro file can be 
represented by smoo th u tili ty func tions . Bo th the existence o f  cycles 
and emp tiness o f  the core will be s truc turally s table in a sense to be 
made precise below . 
As a direc t corollary o f  this resul t we ob tain an al terna tive 
proo f o f  the necessi ty o f  the cardinali ty res traint for an al terna tive 
se t o f  fini te cardinali ty :  tha t  i s  to say we show tha t  i f  IW I l v ( a )
then there exis ts an acyclic pro file P such tha t  G C( a , P ) i <P and 
GO ( a, P ) = <II. We also show tha t  the a(P ) cycle so cons truc ted belongs 
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to the pare to se t. 
In the case tha t  W is a topological vec tor space , the 
assump tion tha t  dim(W) 2 v ( a) - 1 is no t sufficient to guarantee tha t
a core canno t exist. Indeed, we shall show tha t  whenever 
dim(W) < w* ( a) then a s truc turall y s table core ma y also exist. 
SMOOT H SO CI AL CHOICE 
The mos t general assump tion tha t  we make here is tha t  the se t 
o f  al terna tives, W, is a smoo th mani fold (possibl y wi th boundar y) o f
dimension w .  More res tric tive assump tions are tha t  W is a subse t o f  a 
topological vec tor space , or tha t  i t  is admissible (and thus compac t, 
convex) . A smoo th pre ference for i is a smoo th func tion ui : w -7 JR 
tha t  represen ts i t's pre ference i .e . ,  for all 
y,x e W, ui ( y) > ui (x) <=> yPix . A smoo th pro file for N is a func tion 
u = ( u1 ·�·. , un) : W -7 JR
n 
such tha t  each u _  is a smooth pre ference for i .  When U(W) N is endowed 1 
wi th the Whi tne y Cr- topolog y then we wri te i t  as Ur (W)
N ( see [12] ) .
No te in par ticular tha t  �hen W is a topological vec tor space , 
wi th norm I I  I I, then a neighborhood N (u, &) ,  in U1 (W)
N o f  a pro file
u e U(W) N includes any smoo th pro file v such tha t
ll ui (x) - vi Cx >ll < & and ll dui (x) - dvi Cx >l l  < & 
for all i e N and all x e W .  In this case the di fferential , 
o f  ui a t  x ma y be iden ti fied wi th the gradient
aui aui 
ax1 ··
···axw 
du _ (x) , 1 
I
>I • 
Ix 
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A subse t V of Ur (W)
N is called residual i f  i t  is the 
intersec tion o f  open dense subse ts o f  Ur (W)
N . Since Ur (W)
N is a Baire
space , an y residual subse t o f  U (W) N is also dense . A property K r 
which can be sa tis fied b y  a u tili ty pro file is called generic in 
U (W) N i ff the se t {u e U(W) : u sa tis fies K} is residual in U (W) N . r r 
No te in par ticular tha t  i f  K is a generic property than the se t 
{u e U(W) N : u fails K}
is the complemen t of a dense se t, and thus has emp ty in terior in 
Ur (W)
N . 
For an y coali tion, de fine the global optima se t for coali tion 
M a t  u e U(W)N to be 
GO(M,u)  = {x e W :  � y e W s . t. ui ( y) > ui (x) Vi e M} . 
The global op tima se t a t  u for the whole socie ty, N, is also called 
the (global) Pare to se t. 
Suppose now tha t  a is a social pre ference func tion wi th 
decisive coali tions ID • At the pro file u e U(W) N we ma y wri te a 
GO(a,u)  for the core, and no te tha t  GO(a,u)  c n GO (M,u) where the 
intersec tion is over all M in ID a. I f  a is a vo ting rule then this
inclusion will be an equali ty. We ma y charac terize GO(M,u) b y  
considering the cri tical (or infini tesimal) op tima se t for M.  The 
direc tion gradient dui (x) o f  ui a t  x ma y be regarded as a linear map
dui (x)  : TxW -7 JR where TxW is the ta ngen t space a t  x .
tha t  W c JR w then T W ma y be iden ti fied wi th JR w . x 
In the case 
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The pre ference cone o f  individua l i a t  x is 
Hi (x) = {v e TxW : dui (x) (v) > O} , 
and the pre ference cone o f  coa li tion M a t  x is 
HM (x) n H. (X). ieM 1 
A smoo th curve c : [ 0 , 1 ]  -7 W from a poin t x = c (O)  in W to a point
y c ( l ) in W is ca lled an optimizi ng curve for M, a t  the pro file u, 
i ff a t  each point z e W a long the curve the di fferentia l dc (z)  at z 
be lo ngs to HM(z) . In par ticu lar this imp lies tha t  ui ( t  + o) > ui ( t) 
for t e [ 0 ,1 ) , o su fficien tly small, and a ll i e M.  Wri te y pMx when
there is an op timizi ng curve for M from x to y .  
De fini tion 2 
ID a ·
Le t u e U(W) N , and le t a b e  a n  SF wi th decisive coa li tions
(i)  For coa li tion M c N de fine the cri tica l (or infini tesima l) 
optima se t for M a t  u to be 
IO (M, u)  = {x e W :  HM (x) = <PJ. 
( ii) De fine the local optima se t for M a t  u to be 
LO (M, u)  = {x e W : 3 nbd . V o f  x s t  y p� for no ye V} . 
( iii) De fine the cri tica l and local cores, respec tive ly,  o f  a(u)  
by 
IO ( a,u)  = n IO (M,u)
and 
LO ( a, u )  = n LO (M, u) , 
where the intersec tions are taken over a ll M in ID • a 
14 
( iv)  De fine the local cyc le se t L C( a,u)  o f  a(u)  as fo llows :  
( v) 
x e L C( a,u)  
i ff for any open neighborhood V of x there is a sequence 
fx2 , • • •  , xr} o f  points in V such tha t  x px2 px3 , • • •  , pxr px, 
where we wri te y pz i ff for some M e  ID a there exists an M­
op timizing pa th from z to y, which s tays wi thin V.  
De fine the cri tica l cyc le se t, IC( a,u) , o f  a a t  u as 
fo llows :  
x e I C( a,u) 
i ff for some subse t ID ' c ID it is the case tha t  for eacha 
M e  ID', there exists a (non-zero ) vec tor vM e HM(x) such 
tha t  } �vM = 0, where a ll � are s tric tly posi tive real MeiD ' 
numbers . 
Some commen ts shou ld be made abou t the re la tionships be tween 
these se ts .  First o f  a ll for coa li tion M, and pro fi le u, i t  fo llows 
tha t  i f  y pMx then ui (y) > ui (x) for a ll i e M .  Moreover i f  HM(x) = <P 
then y pMx for no y e W .  Thus for a a socia l pre ference func tion
GO ( a,u)  c LO ( a,u)  c IO ( a,u) . 
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Under certain convexity assumptions (such as strict pseudo-concavity 
[15] ) on the utility functions it wi ll be the case that, for each 
M c  N,  
GO (M,u)  IO (M, u) . 
Moreover if a is a voting rule, and preference satisfies the 
appropriate convexity assumption then the global and critical optima 
sets for a(u) will coincide.  
Secondly, we may characterize IO ( a,u)  and IC ( a, u )  in a 
somewhat different fashion. For a profi le u e U(W) N, we may represent
the differential du . (x) of u. at x by a vector p . (x) in ]lw of unit1 1 1 
length , where pi (x) is the normal ( of unit length) to the indifference
surface u �1 [u.(x) ] pointing in the direction of increasing u . •  For1 1 1 
any M c  N, we shall say the vectors {pi (x) : i e M} are semi ­
positively dependent , iff there exists a solution to the e quation 
0 ) A.ipi (x)1eM 
where all A.i 2 0 but not a ll A.i = O. Let pM(x) be the convex hull of 
{pi (x) : i e M} . Semi-positive dependence is e quivalent to 0 e pM (x ) .
By standard results this implies HM(x ) =CF [3 1 ]. Let Int W stand for
the interior of W. Then, for x e Int W, it is the case that 
x e IO (M,u) iff 0 e PM (x) . 
Now define the directiona l core , pa(x) , of a(u)  at x to be 
pa(x) = n pM(x) where the intersection is over all M in ID (x) . Here
16 
ID (x) {M e IDa : HM(x) F C)l}. From [30] , it is known that
(i)  x e IC ( a,u)  iff pa(x) = CF.
( ii) IC ( a,u)  is open and contained in LC ( a, u )  n Int W.
Moreover from [37] , LC ( a,u)  is contained in the c losure, clos IC ( a, u ) , 
of IC ( a,u) . Since, by definition LC ( a,u)  is contained in the global 
cyc le set , GC(a,u) , of a (u ) , the non-emptiness of IC ( a,u)  guarantees 
the existence of a(u)  cycles . On the other hand , emptiness of IC ( a,u)  
guarantees the non-existence of loca l cycles , though not of global 
cycles . 
In paral le l  fashion the emptiness of IO ( a,u)  implies the 
emptiness of the core GO(a,u) . Just as in the discrete case with a 
finite W the non-existence of a ( P ) -cycles imp lies the existence of a 
core, so in the case when W is admissible and preference is smooth 
does the emptiness of IC ( a,u)  imply the non-emptiness of IO ( a, u ) . 
Previous resu lts on the behavior of IC ( a,u)  and IO ( a,u)  for a non-
co llegia l voting rule, a, are summarized in the fo llowing : 
S ummary of Previous Resu lts 
Let a be a non-co llegial voting rule with Nakamura number 
v ( a) , and let u stand for a smooth profile ( in U(W) N) on a smooth
manifold W of dimension w .  
Sl. If w � v ( a) - 2 then IC ( a,u)  = � [35] . 
S2 . If W is admissible and IC ( a,u)  =�then IO ( a, u )  F � [37] . 
S3 . If W is admissib le with w � v ( a) - 2 and P is a "convex" and 
"continuous" p rofi le then GO(a,P)  I <fl [36,  40] . 
S4 . If w = v ( a) - 1 then IC ( a , u) , if non-emp ty, be lo ngs to the 
inte rio r of the c ri tica l  pare to se t IO (N,u)  [35] . 
SS . The re exists an intege r w ( a) � n - 1 such tha t  
(i)  w 2 w ( a) imp lies {u e U(W) N : IO ( a,u)  n Int W ='Pl is
residua l in Ur(W)
N , fo r any r 2 1 .
(ii) w 2 w ( a) + 1 imp lies Cu e U(W) N : IO ( a,u)  =<fl ) and 
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Cu e U(W) N IC(a,u)  is open dense in W J  a re bo th residua l 
in U ( W) N, fo r any r 2 1 [31] . r 
S6 . If a is simp le q-maj o ri ty ru le then the intege r w ( a) = q [31 ]. 
If a is simp le majo ri ty ru le wi th n odd then w ( a) = 2 whe reas if 
n is even then w ( a) = 3 [34] . 
In S3 , "con tinui ty" of a p rofi le ,  P ,  means tha t  fo r each Pi ' i e N, i t
is the case tha t  fo r any x e W, the se t Cy e W : xPiy )  is open in W .
"Convexi ty" of P means tha t  fo r each i e N and each x e W the re exis ts 
a vec to r  vi (x) e W such tha t  the se t {y e  W : vi (x) ( y  - X) ) 0 )
contains {y e W : yPix ) . S3 fo llows f rom Sl and S2 toge the r wi th the 
convexi ty assump tion . This resu lt was independently ob tained by 
S trnad [ 40 ]  and gene ra li zes the resu lt of G reenbe rg men tioned in the 
p revious sec tion. 
Ou r pu rpose in this pape r is to extend these resu lts by 
showing tha t  any vo ting ru le can be c lassified by two intege rs ,  the 
s tabi li ty ,  and ins tabili ty intege rs ,  v* ( a) and w* ( a) respec tive ly .  
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Defini tion 3 
Le t a be a vo ting ru le . 
( i )  The s tab le subspace of p rofi les on W is defined to be 
O ( a,W) {u e U(W) N IO ( a,u)  I 'PJ. 
If u be longs to Int O ( a,W) , the inte rio r of O ( a,W) , in 
U1 (W)
N, then a is said to have a s truc tu ra lly s tab le op tima 
se t a t  the p rofi le ,  u .  
(ii) The uns tab le subspace of p rofi les on W is defined to be 
C ( a,W) Cu e U(W) N IC ( a,u)  I <Ill.
If u be longs to Int C ( a,W) , the inte rio r of C ( a,W) , in 
01 (W)
N, then a is said to have a s truc tu ra lly s tab le cyc le 
se t a t  u .  
C lassifica tion Theo rem fo r Vo ti ng  Ru les 
Le t a be any non-co llegia l  vo ting ru le . Then the re exis t 
fini te intege rs v* ( a) and w* ( a) , whe re v* ( a) < w* (a) , ca lled the 
s tabi li ty and ins tabi li ty intege rs ,  respec tive ly ,  such tha t, 
( i )  In t O( a,W) I <fl fo r eve ry smoo th manifo ld , W ,  o f  dimension w 
if and only if w � w* ( a) - 1 .  
(ii) In t C ( a, W) I cl> fo r eve ry smoo th manifo ld , W, of dimension w 
if and only if w 2 v* ( a) + 1 .  
The necessi ty aspec t of (i)  re qui res tha t  if w 2 w* ( a) then the re 
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exists a manifold W ,  of dimension w,  such that Int O(a,W) = �. This 
essentially is known f rom p revious results . Fo r sufficiency in (i ) we 
need to show that fo r any smooth manifo ld W, if dim(W) i w* (a) - 1 
the re the re exists a st ructu rally stable optima set .  
Fo r necessity in (ii )  it must be shown that if w i v* (a) then
Int IC(a,W) = � fo r any smooth w-dimensional manifold . If 
w i v (a) - 2 then IC (a,W) = �. and so the candidate fo r v* (a) is 
v (a) - 2 .  We shall show this is the case , by demonst rating that 
dim(W) 2 v* (a) implies that a st ructu ra lly stab le cycle set exists in 
W .  Suppose now that W i s  a smooth manifold, without bounda ry ,  o f  the 
dimension w (a) given in SS . By that resu lt {u e U (W) N : IO (a,u)  = �} 
is residual and thus dense in U1 (W)
N . Thus O (a,W) may contain no 
inte rio r. Consequently w* (a) i w (a) . Note also that (S2 )  does not
imply that fo r any manifold W of dimension w i v (a) - 2 it is the case 
that a smooth p rofile u can be found in Int IO (a,u) . Howeve r, it is 
reasonable to expect that v* (a) i w* (a) - 1 .  We show this to be the 
case . In pa rticular fo r a non-col legial voting rule,  a, let 
q = min{ IM I : M e  ID }, and define s (a) to be n - 2 • We shall show a n - q 
that s (a) < w* (a) . In othe r wo rds if W is a manifold with dimension 
w i s (a) then the re exists a smooth p rofile in Int O (a,W) . Mo re 
specifically we sha ll p rove the following theo rem in the next two 
sections. 
Theo rem 1 :  Suppose that a i s  a non-collegial voting rule with 
Nakamu ra numbe r v (a) . (i) If W is any smooth manifold of dimension 
w 2 v (a) - 1 then the re exists a smooth p rofi le in Int C (a,W) . (ii) 
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If W is a smooth manifo ld of dimension w i s (a) then the re exists a 
smooth p rofi le in Int O (a,W) . 
Theo rem 1 ,  togethe r with p revious resu lts , implies the classification 
theo rem . To i llust rate Theo rem 1 conside r the case of simp le maj o rity 
ru le . If n is odd (n = 2k + 1) then q = k + 1 and 
2k - 1 I s (a) = -k = 2 - 1 k .  Thus only in 1 dimension may a st ructu ra lly 
stable optima set be found . If n is even ( = 2k ) then q = k + 1 and 
s (a) = tk _- 12 = 2 ,  and so a st ructu rally stable optima set may be 
found in two dimensions but not in th ree dimensions . Now conside r a 
q- ru le ,  a .  Fo r q = n - 1 we obtain s (a) = n - 2 ,  and thus 
w* (a) = w (a) = n - 1 .  Fo r q i n - 2 ,  clea rly 
s (a) = n - 2 2 __g__ > v* (a) , and so a st ructurally stable optima setn - q  n - q  
may , in some cases,  be found in dimension g reate r than v* (a) . 
Although theo rem l(ii) p rovides a lowe r bound on w* (a) , the re 
is no known p rocedu re to compute w* (a) , as yet , fo r a gene ral non-
col legia l voting ru le . The re is some indication, howeve r, at least 
fo r a q- ru le ,  that w* (a) = 2q - n + 1 .  
STRUCTURALLY STABLE CYCLES 
In this section we shall show that in dimension v (a) - 1 the re 
exists a smooth p rofile u, with a st ructu rally stable cycle set,  unde r 
the voting rule a .  We shall also deduce a numbe r of co rol la ries of 
this resu lt and discuss its significance . 
The impo rtant const ruction that we shall use is that of the 
a-complex . 
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We shall show that whenever ID is a fami ly of subsets of N 
with Nakamura number v ( ID) then there is a comple x in dimension 
v (a) - 1 which represents ID • 
First of all the abstract simp le x, A(Y ) , of dimension v - 1 in 
lRw , is the conve x hu ll of a set Y of v distinct vertices {y1 , . . .  , yv}.
Say .A(y) is spanned by y .  Opposite the verte x yj i s  the face
F ( j )  = A(Y\ {yj }) of dimension v - 2 .  We shall use the term ed ge for 
an intersection of faces ; thus if R is a  subset of V = {1 , • • •  , v }  then 
the edge 
F ( R )  
i s  a simp le x itse lf o f  dimension v 
n F ( j )
j eR 
1 - (R ( opposite {yj 
In particu lar if R = ( 1 ,  • • •  , j  - 1 ,  j + 1 ,  • • •  , v} then F ( R )  
j e R }. 
{yj } and 
if (R I = v then F ( R) = �. If .A(Y ' )  is a simp le x, spanned by Y '  c Y ,
then the barycenter of ACY ' )  is the point 
9-(A(Y ' ) )  = ,!.- L y . •1Y 1 y• J Yje 
A comple x, A, of dimension v - 1 ,  based on Y = {y1 , • • •  , yj , • • •  , ys } is a 
family A of abstract simp lices {A(Yr) : yr c Y }  where each simp le x 
A(Yr ) in A has dimension at most v - 1 ,  and A is c losed under
intersection. That is to say, if A(Yj ) ,  A(Yk) e A then
ACYj > n A<Yk > e A.
If ID is a fami ly of subsets (or decisive coa litions) of N, 
let ID m be the minima l subfami ly of ID (known a lso as the set of
minima l decisive coa litions) . Thus M e IDm iff M e ID and for no 
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V c N is M\ V e ID • We shall a lso refer to any subfami ly ID ' of ID m as
a minima l subfami ly. We now show that we may represent ID by a 
comp le x  .A( ID ) • 
Definition 4 
Let ID be a fami ly of subsets of N, with Nakamura number, v .  
A representation of ID is a comp le x  A of dimension (v - 2) in lR v -l , 
spanned by Y = {y1 , • • •  , ys }, and a surjective correspondence
( i )  
cl : 2N -7 A such that 
cl is a bijective correspondence between IDm and the set of
faces of A ( i . e . ,  to each M e IDm there is e xact ly one face
(or (v - 2) dimensiona l simp le x) cl(M) 
(ii) for any ID' c IDm with C ( ID  ') f. <p then
cl( C ( ID  ' ) )  cl( ID  ' )  
where 
cl( ID ' ) = 0 cl(M)
and the intersection is over a ll M e ID ' • 
( iii) if ID i = {M e ID m : i e M} f. <p then
cl( { i }) 9-( cl( ID i) )  = 0( cl( C ( ID  i ) ) ) . 
( iv)  if ID i = <p then <f( {i }) is the "iso lated" verte x y i in A. 
Write cl : ID -7 A( ID) for a representation of ID • If a is an SF, with 
decisive coa litions ID a' and cl : ID a -7 A( ID <>") represents ID a' then
23 
say A( ID a) repre sent s a,  call A the a-complex and write A(ID a) as Aa. 
Le mma 1 
Let ID be a family of sub set s  of N, with Nakamura number 
v < "" and let ID ' be a minimal subfamily of ID with I ID ' I = v and 
C CID ' ) = <II. Then there exi st s  a simplex A( Y) of dimension (v - 1 )
spanned b y  Y = {yl ' ····Yv} and a repre sentation ci :  ID '  � A( ID ' )
where A( ID ' )  i s  the complex ba sed on the face s of A(Y ) . Moreover, 
(i)  there exi st s  a sub set V = { 1 ,  • • •  , v} of  N such that for each 
j e V, ci( { j } ) = yj i s  a vertex of A(Y )
( ii) after suitably labelli ng the set s  in ID ' it is the case that 
for each M .  e ID ' , ci(M.) = F ( j )  the face of A(Y) oppo site y .  J J J 
( iii) for each i e N with ID i = {M e ID ' : i e M} 'I <fl 
then ci( {i} ) 9-(A(Yi ) ) ,
for the set Yi {yj e Y : j e Vi} '
if and o nly if i e Mj for each j i Vi and i t Mj for each
j e Vi . 
Proof. Clearly if v ( ID ) = v then there exi st s  a subfamily ID ' of ID m 
with cardinality IID 'I = v and C ( ID  ' )  =<II. Let A(Y )  be the ab stract 
simplex of dimen sion (v - 1) spanned by {y1 , • • •  , yv} in ]R
w , where 
Wi.V - 1 . Since A(Y )  has v face s, each coalition M .  e ID ' may be J 
a ssigned by ci to exactly one face F ( j )  of A(Y ) . Con sider any M. e ID ' J 
and let ID j ID ' \ {Mj } .  By defi ni t ion, IID
j l = v - 1 ,  and so 
C ( ID  j ) 'I <fl. Moreover, a family of (v - 1) face s of A(Y )  ha s 
intersection in a vertex of A(Y ) . We may relabel vertice s such that 
for each j e V = { 1 ,  • • •  , v} ,
ci( ID j ) n ci(M) . For i 
MeID j 
y . = ci( ID j ) where a s  beforeJ 
e C ( ID j ) define ci( {i} ) = yj " From each
C ( ID  j ) we may choo se an individual to be labelled j .  By the 
construction, for each j e V = { 1 ,  • • •  , v} c N it i s  the case that 
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ci( { j } ) = Yj ' where j e Mk for k e V\ { j } , and j t Mj . Clearly for each
j e V, and each i e C ( ID j ) ,  ci( {i} ) satisfie s part ( iii) of the lemma.
Now consider i e N\ V such that ID i = {M e ID ' : i e M} sati sfie s 
1 .{ IID i l .{ v - 2 .  By defi nition ci( ID i ) = ci( C ( ID i ) )  i s  a simplex of
dimension at lea st one . Suppo se that ci( ID i ) = A(Yi ) where
Yi = {yj e Y j e Vi} .  By the construction, i e Mj for each j t Vi 
and i t  Mj for each j e Vi . Define ci( {i} ) = 0( ci( ID i ) )  to complete the 
proof of the lemma . 
Q. E. D. 
Theorem 2 
Let a be a non-collegial voting rule, with Nakamura number 
v ( a) . Then there i s  a a-complex A , of dimension v ( a) - 2 in ]Rw , fora 
w 2 v ( a) - 1 ,  which repre sent s a .  Moreover ,  for each i e N ,  ci( {i} ) 
sati sfie s the propertie s pre sented in lemma 1 .  
Proof: Let ID a be the family of deci sive coalitions of a .  For some 
non-collegial subfamily ID ' c ID a of minimal deci sive coalitions, with
I ID 'I = v (  a) , construct the complex A( ID ' )  repre senti ng ID ' ,  u si ng the 
procedure of lemma 1 .  Extend the representation ci : ID ' � ACID ' )  to
<:/ : ID m -7 ACID m) by addi ng new face s and ve rtice s a s  requi red .  In 
particular if i e M fo r no M e IDm define <:/C{i} ) to be an i solated
ve rtex yi . 
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Q. E. D. 
To illu st rate the theorem conside r the following example .  
Example 1 
Conside r the voting rule with six playe rs {1 , 2, 3 , 4, 5 , 6} whe re 
ID a {M1 ,M 2,M3 ,M 4,M4} and M1 = { 2, 3 , 4} ,  M 2 = ( 1 , 3 , 4} ,  M3 = { 1 , 2, 4, 5 } , 
M4 = { 1 , 2, 3 , 5 } , M5 = ( 2, 3 , 4, 6} .  Clearly v Ca) 4. Choo se 
ID' = CM1 ,M 2, M3 ,M4J and const ruct the simplex A spanned by 
Y = {y1 , y 2, y3 , y 4} a s  follows.
Since C CID ' \ {Mj } )  = { j }  fo r j = 1, • • •  , 4, 
we define <:/C{ j } )  = Yj fo r j = 1 ,  • • •  , 4. 
Thus <:/CMj ) i s  spanned by Y \ { yj} fo r j = 1 ,  • • •  , 4. Now { 5 }  i M1 U M 2 
and so <:/C{ S } ) i s  defined to be the ba rycente r of the simplex Cy1 , y 2) 
spanned by Y1 and y 2• 
Then define ACID') to be the complex con si sting of the four 
face s of A. Finally ,  adjoin an i solated ve rtex <:/C{ 6} ) to obtain the 
complex Aa rep re senti ng a.
As an immediate co rollary of Theo rem 2 we shall show that 
v •Ca) = v Ca) - 2; that i s  to say we shall show that if 
dim Cw) l v Ca) - 1 then Int C ( a,W) f �. 
Co rolla ry 1 :  Suppo se that a i s  a non-collegial social p refe rence 
function with Nakamura number v Ca) . If W i s a smooth manifold of 
dimension at lea st v Ca) - 1 then Int C Ca,W) i s  non-empty . 
P roof: Let ID' be a minimal subfamily of ID a with (ID' I = v Ca) and 
C CID ') = �. Fu rthe rmo re ,  let N '  = (i e N : i e M fo r some M e ID'} . 
26 
By lemma 1, the re exi st s  a sub set V = { l , • • •  , v} of N,  whe re v = v Ca) , 
and a Cv - 1 ) -dimen sional simplex ACY ) in JRv-l whe re 
Y = {yi : i e V J, who se face s fo rm a complex ACID') which rep re sent s 
ID' . For each i e N '  define <:/C{i} ) a s  in the p roof of lemma 1 .  By 
the const ruction of lemma 1 ,  it i s  the ca se that fo r each Mj e ID ' and 
each i e Mj , <:/C{i} ) e <:/CMj ) ,  whe re <:/CMj ) i s  the face , F Cj ) , 
rep re senting M .• J 
Let e be the barycente r of ACY ) , and fo r each i e N '  define 
Pi = <:/C{i} ) - e. 
Fo r each M. e ID', it is the case that the vectors {p. : i e M.} a re J 1 J 
not semi-po sitively dependent , and thu s 0 i PM .  whe re PM. i s  the 
convex hull of (pi : i e Mj } .
the face F Cj )  =</CM.) . J 
J J 
Mo reover, PM . 
may be identified with 
J 
Since ACY ) i s  in JRv-l , the v distinct face s of ACY )  do not
inte rsect . Thu s 
pa n PM = q>. ID ' j 
Conside r a point x in the inte rio r of the manifold , W .  Since the 
tangent space , T W, i s  i somo rphic to JRv-
l , we may embed the complex x 
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ACID ' )  in Txw,  so tha t  the barycenter 0 coincides wi th the origin of
TxW .  For each i e N ', cons truc t  a smoo th u tili ty ui ' W � lR such
tha t, wi th respec t to an appropria te coordinate char t dui (xl  is
represented by a vec tor pi (x) in TxW wi th pi (x) =pi . Assign arbi trary
smoo th preferences to individuals in N\N '. By cons truc tion, 
� (x) I q> for all M. e ID •, and so ID ' c ID (x) , where as before
j J 
ID (x) = {M e ID : �(x)  I q>J. Moreover,  pM .  (x)
J 
M . e ID ' , and so J 
pa(x)
Hence 
n PM (x) c pa = q>. ID (x) 
x e IC ( a,u)  and so x e LC ( a,u) . 
PM .  for all
J 
Clearly the cons truc tion is s table under small per turba tions 
of u in the c1- topology . In o ther words , there exists o > 0, for o 
sufficiently small , and a neighborhood N (u , o) of u in u1 cw)
N such 
tha t, for all u '  e N(u, o) ,  x e IC ( a, u ') . Hence Int C ( a,W) is non-
emp ty .  
Q.E.D . 
Immedia tely from Corollary 1 we see tha t  v* (a) + 1 = v ( a) - 1 ,  and so 
the s tabili ty dimension for a non-collegial social preference 
func tion, a, is v ( a) - 2 .  
The proof of Corollary 1 and the no tion of a a-complex are 
essen tia lly developed from a procedure firs t used by Greenberg [13 ) 
and then by S trnad [ 40 ,  lemma 3 )  to show the exis tence of a smooth 
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profile u o n  an admissible se t W of dimension v ( a) - 1 ,  such tha t  
GO ( a,u)  = IP. Their resul t can b e  sligh tly generalized . 
Corollary 2 
Suppose tha t  a is a non-collegial social preference func tion 
wi th Nakamura number v ( a) . 
( i )  I f  W is an admissible se t o f  dimension a t  leas t v ( a) - 1 ,  
then 
C ( a,W) \ O( a,W) {u e U (W) N : IC ( a,u)  I IP and IO ( a, u )  = <PJ
has a non-emp ty interior in U1 (W)
N . 
( ii) If dim(W) = v ( a) - 1 then there exis ts u e U (W) N such tha t
IC ( a,u)  is open dense wi thin the global pare to se t GO(N,u) . 
Proof: In precisely the same way as Corollary 1, le t ACID ' )  be the 
complex, based on A(Y ) , which represents ID ', for ID ' a non-collegial 
subse t of IDm, of cardinali ty v = v ( a) . Embed A(Y )  in the interior of
W .  For each i e N ', the ver tex q( {i} ) o f  ACID ' )  may b e  identified 
wi th a point vi ' say, in W .  Assign to individual i e N ', the Type I 
(or Euclidean) u tili ty f unc tion 
u. (x)  = - l lx - v . 1 1 2 • ]. ]. 
( i )  T o  each individual i e N\N ' assign a n  arbi trary smooth 
preference u. • For each M. e ID ' , regard the face F ( j )  , ]. J 
which represents M ., as a convex se t in w .  By defini tion J 
F ( j )  = con{v.  : i e M .} .  For any x e F ( j ) , and any i e M., ]. J J 
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dui (x) = l(vi - x )  where l > O. Bu t then {dui (x)
are semi-posi tively dependent. Consequen tly 
i e Mj } 
F ( j )  = IO (Mj ,u) . ( Indeed since the preferences of the 
members of M .  are convex, F ( j )  = GO(M., u ) ) .J J 
faces of A( Y) do no t intersec t  we ob tain 
IO ( a,u)  c 0 IO (M . , u) = <p. 
ID • J 
Since the v 
Now consider the barycen ter 0 of A(Y ) . Jus t as in Corollary 
2 ,  for each M. e ID•, the convex se t PM ( 0) may be J j 
iden tified wi th the face F ( j ) . Thus 
Hence 
Pa( 0) c 0 PM ( 0) ID , j 
0 F ( j ) = <p. 
M . e ID' J 
0 e IC (a, u) , and so IC ( a,u)  # <p. 
We have now cons truc ted a smoo th profile u e U1 ( W)
N such
tha t  IO ( a,u)  = <p and IC ( a,u)  # <p. Again the cons truc tion is 
s table under small per turba tions in the c1- topology . Hence 
there exis ts & > 0 and a neighborhood N ( u , &) of u in U1 ( W)
N 
such tha t  IO ( a,u') = <p and IC (a,u') # <p for all u '  e N ( u , &) .
Thus the se t C ( a, W) \ O( a, W) has non-emp ty interior in u1 cw)
N . 
( ii) Suppose now tha t dim( W) = v ( a) - 1 .  In this dimension i t  
has already been shown [ 35, lemma 4] tha t  IC ( a,u)  c IO (N,u)
for all u e U( W) N . Proceed as  in the cons truc tion of the 
profile u in par t (i)  of this proof, bu t to each individual 
i e N\N ' assign the Type I u tili ty func tion 
u. (x)  = - l l x - v . 112 l. l. 
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for some point vi i s  the interior of A(Y ) . A s  a consequence
GO(N,u)  = IO (N,u)  ACY ) . Moreover, for � poin t x in the 
interior of A(Y )  i t  is the case tha t  p (x)  c 0 pM (x)  = <p. a ID' j 
Thus Int A(Y )  c IC ( a,u) . Hence IC ( a, u )  is open dense in the 
global pare to se t GO(N,u) . 
Q . E.D . 
The second par t of Corollary 2 shows, in dimension v ( a) - 1 ,  
tha t  a profile can be cons truc ted so tha t  local cycles "fill "  the 
pare to se t. However, in tha t  dimension no local cycles can occur 
ou tside the pare to se t, and so i terative gradien t planning procedures 
based on vo ting rules can "loca te" the pare to se t [see 7 ] . In higher 
dimensions , however, the cycle se t need no t be cons trained to the 
pare to se t and so such planning procedures may no t be effec tive in 
loca ting the core , even if i t  does exist. 
No te tha t  Corollary 2 ( i )  s treng thens Corollary 1, at least in 
the case tha t  W is admissible, by showing tha t no t o nly bas C ( a,w) a 
non-emp ty interior, bu t tha t  the complemen t of O ( a,w) in U1 ( W)
N has a 
non-emp ty interior which intersec ts C ( a,w) . I t  is also clear tha t  
this will b e  the case when W is a manifold of dimension a t  leas t 
v ( a) - 1 .  Al though, this resul t implies tha t  O ( a,w) canno t be open­
dense in U1 ( W)
N, i t  does no t imply tha t  O( a, W) has an emp ty interior
in U1 ( W)
N in this dimension range . 
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Indeed i n  the nex t  sec tion o f  the pape r w e  establish tha t, fo r 
a ce rtain class of vo ting rules , O ( a,W) has a non-emp ty inte rio r in 
U1 (W)
N in dimensions above v ( a) - 1 .
Fi rs t  of all we use Theo rem 2 to show tha t  a co re can exis t in 
a s truc tu rally s table fashion in dimension a t  mos t  v ( a) - 2, even fo r 
non-convex p refe rence . 
Co rolla ry 3 
Le t a be a non-collegial vo ting rule wi th Nakamu ra numbe r 
v ( a) . If W is an admissible subse t of :mw , wi th w i v ( a) - 2 ,  then
{u E U(W) N : GO(a,u)  f cl>} 
has a non-emp ty inte rio r in U1 (W)
N . 
Proof: By Theo rem 2 the re exis ts a complex A in :mr fo r r 2 v ( a) - 1 a 
which rep resents a .  Le t p roj : A � :m w whe re w i v ( a) - 2 ,  be a a 
p rojec tion f rom :m r onto :m w such tha t  p roj (A ) is contained in the a 
inte rio r of W. Le t N '  = {i e N :  i e M fo r some M e  ID a} .  To each
i e N '  assign the Type I smoo th u tili ty func tion 
u.(x) = - l lx - p roj o o( {i Jl l l 2 whe re q( {i} ) is the ve rtex in A 1 a 
rep resen ting i .  To i e N\N ' assign an a rbi tra ry Type I smoo th 
u tili ty .  Thus we have cons truc ted u e U(W) N . By the cons truc tion if 
ID ' c ID a wi th I ID ' I i v ( a) - 1 then C ( ID  ' ) f Cl> and so 
o( ID ') = n o(M) f Cl>. Bu t then p roj ( o( ID  ')) f Cl>. Since each face 
ID , 
o(M) is compac t, convex, so is p roj ( o(M) ) .  By Helly 's Theo rem [1] , 
since w � v ( a) - 2 ,
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n p roj ( o(M) l f Cl>. 
ID a 
As in the p roof of Co rollary 2 ,  if x E p roj 0 o(M) then the di rec tion 
g radients {dui (x) : i EM} a re semiposi tively dependent. Thus 
p roj ( o(M) ) = GO (M,u)  fo r each M E  ID a' and so GO(a,u)  f q>. Mo reove r, 
this p rope rty is p rese rved unde r small pe rtu rba tions of u in U1 (W)
N . 
Thus 
{u E U(W) N : GO(a,u)  f cl>} 
has a non-emp ty inte rio r in U1 (W)
N . 
Q .E. D .  
Since GO ( a,u)  c IO ( a,u) , Co rolla ry 3 es tablishes tha t  a can 
have a s truc tu rally s table op tima se t in dimension v ( a) - 2 .  Thus 
v ( a) - 2 � w* ( a) - 1 .  Since v ( a) - 2 = v* ( a) , by Co rolla ry 1 ,  we find 
tha t v* ( a) i w* ( a) - 1 .
The final aplica tion of Theo rem 2 is to p rovide a p roof of 
Nakamu ra 's resul t [23 ] tha t  the re exis ts an acyclic p rofile P on W 
such tha t  a ( P )  is cyclic when l w l 2 v ( a) . 
Co rolla ry 4 
Le t a be a non-collegial vo ting rule wi th Nakamu ra numbe r 
v ( a) . 
(i)  If P e  A (W) N and GC( a,W, N , P )  f cl> then IWI 2 v ( a) . 
( ii) If l w l 2 v ( a) then the re exis ts P e A (W) N such tha t
GC ( a, W, N , P )  f cl>. 
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( iii) If IWI = v(a) and P e A (W)N such that GC (a ,W ,N ,P )  I <P, then
Proof 
GC (a ,W ,N ,P )  = GO (W,N, P ).  
(i)  Since GC (a,W ,N, P )  I <P there exists Cx1, • • •  ,xr} "=W and a
a(P)-cycle (of length r) 
x1aCP>x2 
• • •  xra(P)x1•
Since a is a voting rule , xa(P )y  =9 xPiy for all i in some
coalition M. in ID • Write x = x0• For each j = 1 ,  • • •  , r ,J a r 
let M. be the decisive coalition such that x. 1P . x . for allJ J- 1 J 
i e Mj.
Suppose that xi = xj for some i # j. Then we obtain
the cycle x . a(P)  ••• a(P )x . a(P )x.a(P)  ••• x1• So without1 1 J 
loss of generality we may suppose that all x1 , ••• ,xr are
distinct , all M1 , ••• , Mr are distinct and lwl L r . Let
ID ' = {M1 , • • •  , Mr} and suppose that C (]) ') I cp. Then there
exists i e C (]) ') such that 
x1Pix2 
••• xrPixl.
But by assumption, Pi 8 A (W) • By contradiction C (]) 
' ) = <P.
and so, by definition of v (a) , I ID  'I l v (a) .  But then
r 2 v (a) and so IWI L v (a) .  
(ii) Suppose that IWI L v ( a).  We now construct a profile 
N P e A(W)  and a a(P) cycle on W .  Let X = Cx1 , ••• ,xv} '  where
v = v(a) , be a subset of W of cardinality v. We adopt the 
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convention that xv+t = xt' for all t. As in the proof of
Corollary 1 , let ]) ' be a non-collegial minimal subfamily of 
]) a with I])' I = v, and construct the complex A (])') in
v-1 lR which represents ]) ' • By definition q ((i} ) e q(M.)J 
whenever i e M. e ID '  where q (M.) = F ( j )  is the face J J 
representing M . • Let Y = Cy1 , • • •  , y  } be the vertices ofJ v 
A (]) ') • For any subset Y' of Y define 
q-
l
( Y') = (i e N' : q ( (i} ) = 0(A (Y') ) } .  
By theorem 2 , if i e q-
l
( Y') then
i e Mj for each j s.t. yj t Y' and
it Mj for each j s.t. yj e Y'.
For each j = 1 ,  ••• ,v ,  and to  each i e q-1 (y . )  assign theJ 
acyclic preference P .  on X which is given by J 
X/jXj+lpj xvPjxl
• • • Pjxj-l"
Consider a subset V' of V = ( 1 ,  • • •  , v} and suppose that 
q ((i} ) = 0(A (Y') ) ,
the barycenter of the simplex ACY') spanned by 
(yk e Y : k e V'} .  Assign to any such individual , i ,  the
acyclic preference PV' on X given by:
xPV,y iff xP� for all 
k e V' 
xICPv,> Y iff xPky and yPjx for some j ,
k e V'.
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( Here I ( P v,> i s  indifference ) .  Clearly PV , i s  acyclic . Now 
consider a face q(Mj ) of A( ID ') , spanned by 
Y\ {yj} = {y1 , • • • , yj-l ' Yj+l •···•Yv} .  For each vertex
yk (k # j) if i e q
-l ( yk) then i is assigned a preference Pk 
such that x .  1Pkx .• Moreover, by the construction, ifJ- J 
i e Mj , then Q( {i} ) = 0(A(Y ' ) )  for some 
Y '  = {yk : k e V '} c Y\ {yj} .  But for each k e V ' , it is the 
case that xj-lPkxj . Thus xj-lPV ,xj . Hence i e Mj implies
x .  1P .x . ,  for j = 2 ,  • • •  , v .  Since we have adopted theJ- J. J 
convention that x0 =xv ' we also find that xvPixl for all
i e M1 • Thus for each j = l , • • •  ,v,  it is the case that 
xj-lPixj for all i e Mj . If i e  Mj for no Mj e ID', assign
i the preference Pi given by xI (Pi) y  for all x , y  e X .
Extend the acyclic preference profile s o  constructed over W 
by defining, for all i e N,  
xPiy whenever x e X ,  y e W\X 
xI(Pi) y  whenever x , y  t X .
By this method w e  have constructed a n  acyclic profile for N 
on W such that 
x1a(P)x2 • • •  a (P)xva(P)x1 • 
Clearly 
GO ( a,W, N , P )  = <II and GC ( a,W,N,P)  {xl , .  • . , xv} # <fl. 
( iii) Consider a a ( P )  cycle 
x1a ( P ) x2 • • •  a (P)xva ( P ) x1, where v = v ( a) as before . 
Let ID ' = {M1 , • • •  ,Mv} be the associated family of decisive
coalitions, such that i e M .  � x .  1P .x .• ClearlyJ J- J. J 
C ( ID  ') = <II. For j = l , • • •  , v ,  consider IDj ID '\ {Mj } .
Since I ID j I = v - 1 ,  there exists j ( say) in C ( ID  j ) .  But 
j e C ( ID  j ) implies
xjPjxj+l pj • • •  xvPjxl • • •  Pjxj _1 • 
Thus for any j = l , • • •  , v  there exists an individual 
( labelled j )  such that x .P .x .  1 , and an individual i, say,J J J+ 
3 6  
such that xj+lPixj . By definition x e GO(W, N, P ) , the pareto
set in W, iff for no y e W is y pareto preferred to x (where 
y is pareto preferred to x iff yPix for all i e N) . Clearly
neither xj+l is pareto preferred to xj ' nor vice versa . 
choose any two alternatives xj ' xk = xj+t say in W. By 
definition k e C ( IDk) has preference
xk = xj+t pk Pkxlk • • • xk-1 " 
Now 
Since this preference is assumed to be acyclic, it must be 
the case that not (x .P . x .+t >• Thus x .  is not paretoJ J. J J 
preferred to xj +t • On the other hand j e C ( ID
j ) has 
preference 
xjPj 
• • •  Pjxj+t pj x .  J-1
and so not (xj+tPjxj ) .  Hence xj+t is not pareto preferred
to xj. Since IW I = v, {x1 , ••• , xv} = GO(W, N, P ) .  Moreover 
GC (a,W,N,P)  = £x1 , ••• , xv) and so the result is proved.
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Q.E.D. 
Example 2 
To illustrate Corollary 2 , consider the voting rule, a, of 
Example 1 again. As we have seen v (a) = 4. Let W be admissible of 
dimension 3 , and let A be the simplex in lR
3 
whose four vertices are 
y1 = (-1/2 ,-1 ,-1) ,  y2 = (-1/2 , 1 ,-1 ) . y3 = ( 1 , 0 , -1 ) ,  y4 = ( 0 , 0 , 1) .
Let y5 = (-1/2 , 0 , -1) ,  the barycenter of y1 and y2 , and let
y6 = ( 1/6 ,1/
3 , 1/3 ) ,  the barycenter of y2 , y3 , y4• Assign Type I
preferences to the six individuals,  so that u. (x) = - l l x  - y. 1 1
2 
for1 1 
i = 1 •••• , 6. Clearly at the origin & = ( 0 , 0 , 0) we may identify the 
gradient of u. with p. (e) = y . •  It is evident that HM (&) # CF  for1 1 1 j 
j = 1 , ••• , 5. To show that & belongs to the cycle set we find four 
vectors vj e HM_ (e) , j = 1 ,  ••• ,
4 such that {v1, v2 , v3 , v4} are
J 
positively dependent. 
(i) M1 = { 2 ,
3 , 4}.  Choose v1 = ( 2 ,
4,1) ; clearly
Pi(e)  • v1 > O for i e M1•
(ii) M2 = {1, 3 , 4}.  Choose v2 = ( 2 ,-
4, 1 ) ;
pi (e) • v2 > o for i e M2•
(iii) M3 = { l, 2 , 4, 5} .  Choose v3
Pi ( 6) • V 3 ) 0 for i e M3•
(-4 , 0 , 1) ; 
(iv) M4 = {1 , 2 , 3 , 5 } .  Choose v4 = ( 0 , 0 ,-1 ) ;
pi (e)  • v4 > o for i e M4•
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Moreover, v4 + l/3Cv1 + v2 + v3 ) = 0. From definition 2 , & e IC (a,u ).
Indeed it  is  clear that IC ( a,u)  is  the interior of A(Y ) , and 
IO (a,u)  = �. 
Example 3
To illustrate Corollary 5 , consider Example 1 again, with a 
finite alternative set W = {x1,x2 ,x3 ,x4} .  To the individuals
i = 1 , 2 , 3 ,4 assign the preferences
X1P1x2P1x3PX4 , x1Plx4;
x2P2x3P2x4P2x1 , x2P2xl;
X3P3X4P3x1P3X2 · X3P3x2;
X4P4x1P4x2P4X3 • X4P4X3•
To individual 5 assign the preference 
x2P4x3P5x4I5xl 
and to individual 6 the preference 
x4P6xl' xlI6x2I6x3
(i) M1 = {2 ,
3 ,4) : xlixl for i e M1 • 
( ii) M2 = { l ,
3 ,4} : x1Pix2 for i e M2• 
(iii) M3 = {1 , 2 , 4, 5) : x2Pix3 for i e M3•
( iv) M4 = {1 , 2 , 3 , 5 } : x3Pix4 for i e M4•
Thus we obtain a cycle 
x1a(P)x2a(P)x3a(P)x 4a(P)x1 • 
Clearly GC ( a, P )  = W = GO (N, P )  and GO ( a , P )  =ct. 
THE STRUCTURALLY STABLE CORE 
In this section o f  the paper we shall show, for a q-rule , a, 
that the instability integer w* ( a) exceeds n - 2 • n - q Let s (n , q )  be the 
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greatest integer such that s ( n, q) � n - 2 • We shall now show that inn - q 
dimension less than or equal to s ( n, q) it is possible to construct a 
smooth pro file u e U (W) N such that a has a structurally stable optima
set at u .  
Theorem 3 
Let a be a q-rule (with n/2 < q � n - 1) and let W be a 
mani fold with dimension w � s ( n,q) . Then Int O( a,W) F <P. 
Be fore proving this theorem, we require one trivial lemma and some 
further de finitions . 
Lemma 2 
Let t ( n, q) 
s ( n, q) < t ( n,q) . 
2q - n + 1 .  I f  n/2 < q � n - 1 then
Proo f: Consider first o f  all the case with (n,q)  = ( 2k + 1 , k  + 1) . 
As we have seen s ( n ,q) < 2 .  Moreover t ( n, q) = 2 and so
s ( n,q )  < t ( n, q ) . If ( n , q )  = ( 2k , k  + 1) then s ( n,q)  = 2 while
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t (n , q )  3 .  Finally consider q = n - 1 .  Clearly s ( n,q)  = n - 2 ,  while 
t (n, q) n - 1 .  Moreover , in the range q e (n/2 , n  - l], s ( n , q )  is a 
monotonically increasing but convex function o f  q ,  while t (n , q )  is 
l i near in q .  Thus s (n , q )  < t ( n , q )  for all q e (n/2 , n  - 1 ] . 
Q.E. D .  
The procedure that w e  use t o  prove Theorem 3 depends on 
allocating vectors in lRw to members o f  N such that for no decisive
coalition M is it the case that the vectors associated with M belong 
to a hal f space.  
Suppose that {pi : i e N} is a family of vectors in lR
w . As
be fore ,  for any subset M o f  N,  let 
HM = { v  e lR
w : pi • v > 0 for all i e M} , and pM = con{pi : i e M}, 
the convex hull o f  the subset o f  vectors . We also de fine the positive 
and ne gative cones o f  pM by 
and 
v E C +(M) i ff v � A . p . where A. > O for all i e M 
i eM 1 i i 
v e C (Ml i ff v = �A . p . where A. < O for all i e M .  - 1 1 1 1£ 
In the obvious way say {pi : i e M} positivel y span C+ (M) , and 
say they are positively dependent i ff 0 e C +(M) . Now let 
V = { 1 ,  • • •  , w  + 1 )  c N and A(Y )  be the w -dimensional simplex in lRw 
with barycenter, e, at the origin o f  lRw , whose vertices
Y = {p . : i e VJ are unit vectors in lRw . For any subset M. o f  V with1 J 
IMj l = w, the convex hull ,  PM . ' is the face o f  A( Y )  opposite pj . J 
Lemma 3 
Let PM. , PM . , PM_ be any three distinct faces of A(Y )  in JR 
w
1 J -1< 
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(where w 2 2 ) . Then there exist (open) neighborhoods Ui c C_ (Mi) and
Uk c C_(Mk) such that, for some vj e C+(Mj ) and any vi e Ui, vk e Uk,
the vectors {v., v.,vk} are positively dependent. 1 J 
Proof: Since A(Y )  is a simplex in JR w, the set {p. : i = 1 ,  • • •  , w  + 1}�� 1 
is positively dependent, and is also a positive span for JR w.
For convenience let Mi = V\ {i} , for i = 1 , • • •  , w  + 1. Consider 
any v. e C+(M . ) .  By definition v .  is positively dependent onJ J J 
{pi : i e V\ {j } } .  Moreover ,  {pi : i e V} is positively dependent, and
so we can write v .  as a positive combinationJ 
w+l
vj = [ µtpt where µt > O for t = 1 , • • •  , w  + 1 .�=1 
Now define 
and let 
ait = pkt = 1/2 µt if t e Mi n Mk.
Pkt = 0 and ait = µt if t e Mi\Mk
ait = 0 and pkt = µt if t e Mk\Mi ,
w+l w+l 
vi = -�
i
aitPt and vk = -�kpitPt •
By these definitions vi e C_ (Mk) and vk e C_ (Mi) .  Moreover
vj = -vi - vk and so {vi, vj , vk} are positively dependent .
From the construction it is evident that there exist neighborhoods Ui
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of v .  in C (M.)  and Uk of vk in C ( M. ) such that v. + vk e C ( M.) for1 - 1 - --k 1 - J 
I I I I I I 
all vi e Ui, vk e Uk . But then vi + vk + vj = 0 ,  for some vj e C+(Mj )
as required. 
Q . E. D .  
Lemma 4 
Suppose that w = s (n,q) , w i n  - 1 , w 2 2 and q i  n - 1. Let 
ID ' = {M c N\ {n} I M I  2 q} , and let A(Y )  be the simplex in JR w with
vertices {pi : i = 1, • • •  , w  + 1} as before. Then there exist vectors 
{pi : i = w + 2 ,  • • •  , n - 1} in JR 
w such that � = IJ> for all M e ID ' • 
Proof: Let V = {1 ,  • • •  , w  + 1} as before and let the faces PM .J 
( j = l , • • •  ,w  + 1) of A(Y )  be associated with the coalitions 
M1 , • • •  ,�+l " We shall say that one of these coalitions Mj , say, is
blocked if � =  IJ> for any M containing Mj .
First of all we block the coalitions M1 , • • •  , Mw . To bloc
k a
coalition M . , associated with a face pM opposite p . , construct aJ j J 
blocking coalition B. c N\V\ {n} of size I B. I  = n - q - 1 2 0, asJ J 
follows . To each member i e B .  assign a vector p. e C (M . ) .  J 1 - · J  Clearly
{pk : k e M.} U {p. : i e B.} are positively dependent , and so HM = IJ> J 1 J 
for any M containing M. with B .  n M = IJ>. Moreover the vector p.J J J 
opposite PM also belongs to C (M . ) .  Since IN\ {n} \ { j } \B. I = q - 1 ,  itj - J J 
is clear that � = 1J> for any M e ID with Mj c M. When the members of
Bj are assigned vectors in C_ (Mj ) so as to bloc
k Mj in this way, we
shall say Bj bloc
ks Mj. Call r = n - q - 1 the bloc
king number.
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Since w � n -
2
, it is the case that w (n  - q - 1 )  � n - w - 2 .n - q 
But then we may construct disjoint blocking coalitions B1 , • • •  , Bw each
of size (n - q - 1 ) , chosen from N\ {n} \V, such that M .  is blocked byJ 
Bj , for j = 1 ,  • • •  ,w .  We now bloc
k coalition Mw+l · Let Bw+l be  the
set of players neither in a blocking coalition nor in N\ {n}\V. Assign 
each member of Bw+l a vector in C_(Mw+l> .  Any coalition M which
contains Mw+l together with a member of Bw+l must satisfy � = ct>. Now
consider Mw+l together with one of the bloc
king coalitions Bj ' say .
But IMw+l U Bj l = w 
+ ( n  - q - 1) < ( 2q - n + 1) + ( n  - q - 1) = q ,
since w � s (n ,q) by assumption, and s (n,q)  < 2q - n + 1 by  lemma 2 .
Thus if M e ID ' and Mw+l c M, M must contain members of two distinct
blocking coalitions . 
By lemma 3 ,  since we suppose w l 2 , there exist neighborhoods 
Uj in C_(Mj ) for j = 1 ,  • • •  ,w ,  with the following property : if
pj e Uj , pk e Uk' for j I 
k, j = 1 ,  • • •  ,w,  then there exists a vector
p e C+(Mw+l> such that {p ,pj , pk} are positively dependent . For each
blocking coalition B1, • • •  , B  assign the members of B .  a vector i n  thew J 
appropriate open set Uj . By this procedure HM = ct> for any M e ID' 
with Mw+l c M.  Thus Mw+l is bloc
ked . Now consider the family
£B1 , • • •  , Bw+l} of bloc
king coalitions . Observe that since w = s (n, q)
we may write 
Thus 
(n  - 2 ) = w(n - q) + r, where 0 � r � n - q - 1 .
I B  I w+l (n - w -
2) - w(n  - q - 1)  r � n - q - 1 .
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Moreover 
(w - l) (n - q - 1) = w(n - q - 1) - ( n  - q - 1)  
� (n  - w - 2 ) - ( n  - q - 1 )  = q - w - 1 .  
Thus no coalition consisting of the union of ( w  - 1 )  of the blocking 
coalitions can belong to ID ' . Choose the neighborhoods U .  in C (M . ) ,J - J 
for j = 1 ,  • • •  , w  such that any family {p . e U .  : j = 1 ,  • • •  , w} is J J 
w+l
positively dependent . Thus HM = cp for any M e ID ' with U Br c M.r=l 
By this construction HM = cp for any M e  ID', thus proving the lemma.
Q .E .D .  
Proof of  Theorem 3 
Consider the case first of all with s (n ,q )  = 1 .  Let W be 
one-dimensional . Choose a profile u : W -7 :JR n such that at x in the
interior of W, dun (x) = O and for i = 1 ,  • • •  , n  - 1 ,  dui (x) = 
+1 or -1
depending on whether i is odd or even. Clearly �(x) = cp for any 
I M I  > n/2 . Now consider the case with s(n , q) l 2 . Let w = s (n, q) , 
and let W be a smooth manifold of dimension w .  
By lemma 4, it is possible to assign vectors 
{pi i 1 ,  • • •  , n  - 1} in :JR
w to the members of N\ (n} such that HM = cp 
for any M e ID ' . Define a smooth profile u : W -7 :JR n such that , at a
particular point , x, in the interior of W, dun (x) = O and
dui (x) = pi for i I n. Clearly if n e M, then HM(x) = C)?. Moreover,
by lemma 4, �(x) = cp for all M e  ID'. Thus x e IO (a,u) . Hence 
u e O (a,W) . 
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But then there is a neighborhood U (u)  of u in U1 (W)
N and a 
neighborhood X (x) of x such that for any u '  e U (u) , u� has an isolated
critical point x '  e X (x ) . The property of the simplex constructed in 
lemma 4, that each decisive coalition be blocked, is clearly preserved 
under small perturbations of the vector s .  Thus for suitable chosen 
U (u)  and X (x )  it is the case that 
x '  e IO ( a, u ' )  for all u '  e U (u) . 
Hence Int IO ( a, w) I <I>. Finally if w < s (n,q)  perform the above 
argument in dimension s (n, q )  and then project down to the lower 
dimension. 
Proof of Theorem l (ii) 
Let a be a non-collegial voting rule . Let 
q = min! I M I M e  ID } and , as before, define s ( a) = n - 2 • By a n - q 
Q.E. D .  
Theorem 3 ,  if dim (W) � s ( a) ,  then there exist a smooth profile u, such 
that , for some point x e W, and any coalition M, with IM I L q, it is
the case that 111 <xl = <p. Moreover, this property is structurally
stable, in the sense that there exists a neighborhood U(u)  of u in 
U1 (W)
N such that this property is true for any smooth profile in U ( u ) . 
But then IO ( a,u ' )  = <I> for all u '  e U (u) , and so Int O ( a,w) / <I>. 
Q.E.D . 
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Corollary S 
Let a be a non-collegial voting rule . If W is admissible of 
dimension � s ( a) then {u e U (W) N : GO(a,u)  I <l>J has a non-empty
interior in u1 cwJ
N . 
Proof: Construct the vectors (pi : i 1 ,  • • •  , n  - 1} as in lemma 4. 
Choose a point x, in the interior of W, and assign individual , n, a 
Type I smooth utility function un (y) = -
l l y - x l l 2 • To each other
individual , i = 1 ,  • • •  , n  - 1 ,  assign a Type I utility function, such 
that at x,  
dui (x) = +Aipi where Ai > o.  
From the construction, x e IO ( a , w) . Indeed x e GO ( a,u) . Moreover, 
there will exist a neighborhood U (u)  of u in u1 cwJ
N such that
GO ( a, u ' )  I <I> for all u '  e U ( u ) . 
Q .E.D . 
It should also be clear that the profile,  u, constructed in 
Corollary S can be chosen so that IC ( a,u)  = <I>. Thus Corollary S can
be extended to show that 
(u e U (W) N : GO(a,u)  I <I> and IC ( a,u) = <I>} 
has a non-empty interior in U1 (W)
N . With Corollary 2 ,  this implies
that in the dimension range [ v ( a) - 1 ,  s ( a) ]  both C ( a, w) \O ( a,w) and 
O ( a,w) \C ( a,W) have non-empty interiors in U1 (W)
N . 
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Example 4 
To illustrate Theorem 3 , consider the q-majority rule with 
( n, q) = ( 6 , 4) .  n -
2 
Clearly �� = 2 .  We construct a structurally stablen - q 
core in two dimensions . Let 
Ml 
Y1
{2 , 3 } ,  M2
( 1 . 0 ) , Y2
{1 ,3 } and M3 = { 1 , 2 }  and
c-./3/2 .-1/2 > . y3 = c-./3/2 , 1/2> .
A blocking group for any two person coalition is of size 
n - q - 1 = 1 , and so we block M3 with {4} and M2 with {S} . We
construct y4 e C_ (M3 ) and y5 e C_ CM2) such that fy2 , y3 , y4 ,y5} are
positively dependent . Let 
Y4 = -y2 - C
,/3 - l/2)y1 ( 1/2 , 1/2)
and 
Y5 = -y3 - c,/3 - l/2>y1 = c 1/2 ,-1/2> .
Clearly ,/3Cy4 + y5 ) + y2 + y3 = ( 0 , 0 ) . Finally let y6 = ( 0, 0 ) .
Assign Type I utility functions to the six players , so that, at a 
point e in the interior of W, dui (6) = yi, for i = 1 ,  • • •  ,
6 . Clearly 
e e GO(a,u) . Moreover ,  the core so obtained is structurally stable ,  
and so u e Int O ( a,W) . 
Example S 
As a further illustration, consider the q rule, a, where q = 8 
n - 2 Clearly �� = 9/3 = 3 , and we shall construct an - q and n = 11 . 
structurally stable core in a 3 dimensional admissible policy space ,
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W .  I n  a similar fashion t o  Example 2 ,  let A(Y )  be the simplex i n  3-
dimensions whose vertices are 
Y1 = (-1/
2 ,-1 ,-1)
Y2 = ( -1/2 , 1 , -1 )
Y3 = ( +1 , 0 ,-1 ) 
Y4 = ( 0 , 0 , 1) .  
and embed A(Y )  in the interior of W ,  so that A(Y )  contains the origin, 
e .  Assign Type I utilities o f  the form u . (x) = - l l x  - y . 1 1
2 
for
1 1 
i = 1 , • • •  , 4 . As before the gradient ui at e is represented by
pi ( &) = yi . The bloc
king number of a is n - q - 1 = 2 ,  so we seek
vectors yi ' i = 
s , • • •  , 10 so that { S , 6} ,  say, block M2 = {
l , 3 , 4} ,  and
{ 7 , 8} block M1 = { 2 ,
3 , 4} .  Let
Ys = -1/2 Y1 - 1/
4 Y3 - 1/4 Y4 = ( 0 , 1/2 ,1/2) and
Y7 = -1/2 Y2 _ 1/
4 y3 - 1/4 y4 = ( 0 ,-1/2 ,1/2) . Clearly y5 e C_ CM2 >
and y7 e C_ (M2 > while y5 + y7 = ( 0 , 0 , 1) e C_ (
l , 2 , 3 ) .  Thus
{y1 ·Y3 · Y4 ·Y5l • {Y2 · Y3 · Y4•Y7l and {y1 , Y2 ·Y3 · Y5 ,Y7l
are all sets of positively dependent vectors . Assign Type I utility 
functions to players { S , 7} ,  so that p5 (e) = y5 , p7 (&) = y7 and
continue , in this fashion, by assigning Type I utilities to the 
players i = 6 , 8 , 9 , 10 .  Finally assign player 11 the Type 1 preference 
u11 (x)  = - l l x l l .
Clearly the origin e is the core GO(a,u) , since l\i(6) = If for all 
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M e ID a• 
CONCLUSION 
Theorem 1 shows that , for any non-collegial voting rule,  if 
the dimension of the policy space belongs to the range 
[v ( a) - 1 ,  s ( a) ]  then both the cycle set IC ( a,u)  and optima set 
IO ( a,u)  may exist in a structurally stable fashion. 
For example ,  if we consider the case of majority rule with n 
even, then, as we have shown, s (n , a) = 2 ,  and so a structurally stable 
core may exist in this dimension. A recent paper by Enelow and Hinich 
[9]  has elaborated on this observation. However ,  it is also known 
that w* ( a) = 3 for majority rule, with n even, and so no 
generalization may be made from the structural stability of the core, 
in two dimensions , to structural stability in higher dimensions . 
It is worth relating the result on the structural stability of 
the core in dimension at most s ( a) to a recent theorem due to 
Rubinstein. Rubinstein [27] has shown that in the space of continuous 
profiles, with the Kannai topology, the set of profiles with non-empty 
core is nowhere dense . Cox [ S ]  has recently shown how this result 
relates to Theorem l (ii) . Let u0 cw>
N represent U (W) N with the 
c0-topology . Essentially two profiles are close in u0 cw>
N if their
values ,  in :!R n, are close . The c1-topology is finer than the
c0-topology : that is to say a set which is open in u0 cw>
N will be 
open in U1 (W)
N, but there exist open sets in u1 (W)
N which are not open 
in U0 (W)
N . Cox has modified Rubinstein ' s  proof to show that the set 
so 
{u e U (W) N : GO ( a, u )  # 'I>} has an empty interior in u0 (W)
N . Note the 
Rubinstein-Cox result requires no dimension constraint on the policy 
space , W. However , as we have noted the c1-topology on profiles is
finer than the c0-topology . In dimension no greater than s ( a) , the
set of profiles 
{u e U (W) N GO(a,u)  # 'I>} 
will contain a subset of profiles which is open in U1 (W)
N but not open
in u0(W)
N . In a sense the perturbation which is required to destroy
the core is "small" in the c0-topology , but this perturbation is
"large " in the c1-topology . 
Cox also obtained a restriction on q sufficient to guarantee a 
structurally stable core for a q-rule in two dimensions . This result 
provided the motivation for Theorem l (ii) . 
As the reader may observe the structural stability and 
instability of the core and cycle set for non-collegial voting rules 
depends on a quite subtle fashion on the dimension of the policy 
space . As yet , however , an algorithm for computing the instability 
dimension w* ( a) for a general non-collegial voting rule is not 
available, although for simple majority rule w* ( a) is known precisely. 
Theorem 1, together with previous results, shows that w* ( a) must lie 
the the range [ s ( a) + 1 ,  w ( a) ] .  A joint paper with McKelvey [ 19] , 
currently in preparation, will examine the problem of a more precise 
upper bound , w ( a) , for the instability integer for q-rules . 
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